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Corporate Liability for Environmental Harm
Amanda Perry-Kessaris*
This chapter explores issues of special relevance to corporate liability for
environmental harm. The term environmental harm is employed in a broad
sense, including damage to human, animals, plant life, water, soil and so on.
Where relevant, a distinction will be drawn between liability for harm to the
environment, and liability for damage to human interests which result from
harm to the environment.
The first half of the chapter explores some essential conflicts between the legal
structure of corporations, and the desire of regulators and victims seeking to
hold them liable for their environmental harm. The corporate form is a
construct of national legal systems. The specific structure and operation of
corporations varies globally, but the basic components are legal personality,
limited liability, transferable shares, management by a board and ownership
by investors (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004, pp. 1, 5-15). Of these, it is a
corporation’s legal personality and limited liability which are of particular
relevance to the topic of liability for environmental harm. The former ensures
that corporations enjoy many of the same rights as human beings, and some
of the responsibilities, but no allowance is made for the fact that they have no
soul. The latter affords corporations with substantial opportunities to restrict
and even avoid liability for their environmental harm.
The second half of this chapter explores what progress has been made at the
international level towards ensuring that corporations are liable for their
environmental harm. Corporations, like other non-state actors, have a
somewhat fuzzy status under the law of nations. Corporations are primarily
the objects, rather than subjects, of the international legal system. They may
benefit from certain aspects of international law, such as the provisions of
bilateral investment treaties, and there are some international fora in which
MNEs have the right to participate, such as the North American Free Trade
Association (NAFTA), but in general, corporations must rely on states to
advocate on their behalf. However, being an object is not all bad, for it also
tends to shield one from being a carrier of liability. Perhaps because states are
chary of the prospect of squaring up to corporations and hobbling their own
businesses with the costs of their externalities, the general principles of
international environmental law, including the polluter pays principle, have
not been ‘explicitly addressed to enterprises’ (OECD, 2000, Commentary para
37).
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1 What is so special about corporations?
1.1 Unnatural personality
The corporation was invented as an entity into which investors could place
their capital, and from which  those investors could derive their share of
profits, but which would protect those ‘shareholders’ from the full extent of
financial liability arising from the activities of the corporation (See Blumberg,
1993, Chapter 1). The aim was to enable investors to pool their assets and take
on bigger or otherwise riskier, projects. In Anglo-American terminology, the
corporate form acts as a ‘veil’ to shield the investor. All that the shareholder
stood to lose when a company falls is the investment they have made in the
company itself, as well as expected profits from the shares. The corporation
could flounder to bankruptcy without  dragging the shareholders’ personal
finances down with it. This facility proved popular and, ‘by the early
twentieth century, corporations were typically combinations of thousands …
of broadly dispersed, anonymous shareholders’ (Bakan, 2004, p. 14).
But the law was now faced with a problem. These shareholders were too
weak, individually or collectively, to influence the manner in which
companies were managed. From a legal perspective, there was a need to
identify ‘some other person to assume the legal rights and duties firms
needed to operate in the economy’(Bakan, 2004, p. 15).  The solution was to
vest the corporation itself with legal personality:
[T]hrough a bizarre legal alchemy, the courts fully transformed the
corporation into a “person” with its own separate identity…and
empowered, like a real person, to conduct business in its own
name, acquire assets, employ workers, pay taxes, and go to court to
assert its rights and defend its actions (Bakan 2004, p. 16).
The attribution of legal personality to corporations has created its own
problems. The law provides to corporations the rights of humans, but it
cannot rely upon corporations to be constrained by the internal moral and
social checks and balances that are natural to most humans. Indeed, Joel
Bakan has observed that, as a consequence of its legal structure, the typical
corporation (as distinct from its executives and shareholders)  shares the
characteristics of a psychopath. Corporations, like psychopaths, are
‘singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine concern for others’. They
‘often refuse to take responsibility’ for their actions and are ‘unable to feel
remorse.’ They are ‘manipulat[ive]’, ‘grandiose’, interact only ‘superficially’,
and are able neither to ‘recognize nor act upon moral reasons to refrain from
harming others’ (Bakan, 204, p. 56-7 and 60).
The psychopathic tendencies of the corporation pose particular challenges to
the environment—a resource which only the most selfless and charitable of
human beings tend to be prone to preserving. For example, Union Carbide,
has demonstrated a remarkable degree of self-involvement and callousness in
its response to 1984 Bhopal disaster, in which toxic gas escaping a factory run
by its subsidiary caused thousands of people died, and ruined the loves of
hundreds of thousands of individuals. Until it was amended in 2004, Union
Carbide’s website described the incident in the following, alternately self-
pitying and coldly calculating, terms:
‘The Bhopal sabotage tragedy, caused by actions of a disgruntled
Indian employee, continues to be a source of anguish for Union
Carbide… Disbursement to victims of the $470 million settlement,
paid in February 1989 to the Indian government, proceeds
slowly… The State Government [of Madhya Pradesh] determines
that there were 40 victims with permanent total disability and 2,680
persons with permanent partial disability; 1,313 persons with
temporary disability from permanent injury and 7,172 persons
with temporary disability from temporary injury; 18,922 persons
with permanent injury with no disability and 173,382 persons with
temporary injury with no disability; 3,828 deaths; and 155,203 who
came in for medical examination had no injury’ (Union Carbide
Bhopal Website up to 2004).
The Bhopal disaster illustrates that the legal and business downsides are often
not significant enough to prevent corporations from first causing
environmental harm, and then evading liability for it.1 Legal systems tend to
convert liability for environmental harm into fines payable to regulators, or
into tort damages payable to victims.  So in the corporate calculation,
environmental harm becomes a cost along with all the others such as the price
of raw materials, shipping, human resources and so on. The legal imperative
for a corporation to maximise shareholder value ensures that its ‘predatory
instincts’ are curbed only by a ‘pragmatic concern for its own interests’
(Bakan, 2004, pp. 60-1). So, corporations require constant reminding and
encouragement to honour environmental considerations and, crucially, these
reminders must be delivered in the corporation’s mother tongue: profit
maximisation and shareholder value. In some cases, it is possible to rely upon
the good conscience of a company’s shareholders as a check on environmental
malpractice by a company. But, as the Union Carbide example suggests,
sometimes these shareholders are themselves ‘psychopathic’ corporations.
1.2 Corporations as multinational shareholders
At the beginning of the last century, the US states of New Jersey and
Delaware lead a further transformation of the corporate form, by dispensing
with the requirement that corporations be constrained in their  purpose,
duration and location. The rules governing mergers and acquisitions were
liberalised and cross ownership between companies was allowed. This series
of reforms was mimicked across the US and abroad, and corporations became
ever larger and more complex, forming themselves into corporate groups and
then multinational enterprises (See Blumberg, 1993, Chapter 3).
The environmental liability—or lack thereof--of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) has been of increasing concern to national and international
commentators, policy makers and civil society actors in recent times has been.
MNEs are composed of corporations or other entities, which are established
in more than one country, and which are linked, whether by contract or
                                                 
1 See the BBC Bhopal Website http://www.bbc.co.uk/bhopal/; Union
Carbide’s Bhopal Website http://www.bhopal.com; Galanter, M. (2002),
‘Law’s Elusive Promise: Learning from Bhopal’ in Likosky, M. ed.
Transnational Law and Legal Process: Globalisation and Power Disparities
Butterworths, 172-83; and Muchlinski (1987) ‘The Bhopal Case Controlling
Ultrahazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken by Foreign Investors’ 50
MLR 545.
equity (share ownership), in such a way that they are able to co-ordinate their
activities. The purpose of adopting the form of an MNE is to maximise
‘shareholder value’. Profits (value) can be maximised by cutting costs,
increasing revenues, or both. Foreign countries can help in this process by
acting as an additional market for the goods and/or services produced by the
firm; or by acting as a cheaper, better quality or more accessible source of the
inputs (labour, raw materials) required by the firm. Firms can access these
benefits that foreign countries can provide in three ways: trading with the
country (possible contract MNE); licensing the production of goods in that
country (possible contract MNE); or investing directly in that country (equity
MNE). For example, Nike is formed of a US parent company, range of wholly
and partly-owned subsidiary companies scattered across the globe.
Furthermore, some of Nike’s suppliers, shippers, retailers and service
providers are connected to Nike by long term contracts. To the extent that
these contracts introduce an element of control by Nike over the other entity,
the latter can be regarded as part of the multinational enterprise (although not
the corporation) that is Nike (see Nike Website). Attention to this issue is
generated by a number of, sometimes contradictory, factors.
1.2.1 Power and influence
One factor which causes MNEs to be at the heart discussions about
environmental harm is the perception  that they occupy a powerful
position—in terms of finance, information, tactics, mobility, influence and so
on—relative to national governments and their regulatory agencies. A
positive spin on corporate power places MNEs in an unrivalled position to
disseminate good environmental practice internationally, in their own
practice and through their participation in professional networks, ‘regardless
of actual levels of governmental regulation’(Muchlinski, 2007, pp. 1001). On
the other hand, a negative spin on the power of MNEs highlights the fact that
public sector mechanisms, whether national or international, may not be up to
the task of  monitoring and punishing powerful MNEs for the environmental
harm that they cause. Each company that makes up a multinational enterprise
‘is subject variously to the laws of each and every state in which it does
business’ (Wallace, 2002, p. 11. See also OECD, 2000, Preface, Para. 7),2 so the
idea that MNEs are necessarily beyond the reach of regulators and victims is
somewhat of a myth. That said, whether states award their regulators and
victims the powers necessary to touch MNEs, whether regulators and victims
choose to exercise those powers, and how MNEs respond to such efforts are
important determinants of the practical extent of liability of MNEs.
For example, a weak environmental law system might be attractive to an
MNE, and a state might choose to implement such a regime precisely in order
to increase foreign investment. Firms choose whether to trade, license or
invest and where to do it based upon the combined forces of what John
Dunning called ownership, internalisation and location advantages.3 Having
                                                 
2 National legal systems tend not to refer directly to multinational
enterprises, but they sometimes contain provisions to govern certain aspects
of the relationships within groups of companies (Wallace, 2002, p. 165).
3 An ownership advantage is a characteristic of the firm that places it at
an advantage as compared to other firms – for example, Ford excelled in the
early automobile industry by introducing a particularly efficient process for
identified ownership and internalisation advantages to be exercised, a firm
will trade, invest or license in places with the most significant location
advantages. For example, a country may have a better supply of skilled
workers, natural resources or joint venture partners (See Dunning, 1993).
There is concern that  an MNE might also regard lax environmental
regulation as such a location advantage, and that this might trigger a ‘race to
the bottom’ in environmental standards as states try to attract MNEs.
Finally, MNEs are often perceive to have a heightened influence—whether
positive or negative—over the environment. For example, they may be
engaged in environmentally sensitive sectors, such as the extraction of natural
resources; or their activities, although not inherently sensitive, may be
conducted on an especially large scale, or in a region hitherto unspoilt by any
industrialisation. Conversely, MNEs are often singled out for ‘their ability to
develop new environmentally friendly technologies and management
practices’, since they may be located at the cutting edge of these fields
(Muchlinski, 2007, pp. 1001).
1.2.2 Jurisdictional challenges
Another reason why MNEs are a focal point for discussions about
environmental liability is the fact that while their activities cross international
boundaries with some degree of freedom, the ability of states to legislate and
adjudicate over them is somewhat constrained. States generally do not
legislate over acts performed outside of their territory, by those other than
their nationals, because to do so challenges the sovereignty of other states.4
Similarly, courts continue to experience difficulties in establishing, and then
choosing to exercise, jurisdiction to adjudicate over cases involving acts which
occur abroad.5 For example, the question of whether the English courts
should exercise jurisdiction over the UK-based Cape Plc. in relation to
asbestosis caused by its South African subsidiary generated a series of
unusually vacillant decisions in the High Court, Court of Appeal and House
of Lords (Adams v. Cape Asbestos, 1990 and 1991). The final decision was that
the English courts had jurisdiction and would exercise it, and this offers hope
for future litigants. But ‘literally hundreds of victims died’ during the
‘prolonged and fierce skirmishing’ over the issue of jurisdiction in this case
(Meeran, 2003, pp. 218 and 224).6 Furthermore, this somewhat limited
                                                                                                                                             
the production of the Model T car. An internalisation advantage may occur
when it is clear that the costs associated with doing business (‘transaction
costs’) by direct investment would be lower than the costs associated with
doing business by trade or licensing. For example, it may be that transport
costs are such that it is cheaper to manufacture a car in its end market, rather
than trading (exporting) the car; or the costs associated with losing control
over the manufacturing process by licensing production by another, make
direct investment a better option.
4 The great exception to this rule is the United States. See, for example,
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Helms Burton) Act 1996 and
the international outrage it caused.
5 For a recent review of extraterritorial adjudicative and prescriptive
jurisdiction see De Schutter, 2007.
6 For an assessment of judicial reasoning in the Cape cases, see
progress in relation to jurisdiction over human victims of ecological damage
does not imply progress in relation to jurisdiction over cases brought by
environmental activists in relation to solely ecological damage (Ong, 2001, p.
701).
One important innovation which has helped foreign claimants to get around
legislative and adjudicative jurisdictional barriers in the United States is the
creative use of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) of 1789.7 The ATCA simply
states that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States’ (Emphasis added). 8 The practical effect of the law
is to convert the breach, in a foreign jurisdiction, of a fundamental principle of
international law into a tort under US law. This then allows the foreign victim
to make a claim in US courts for damages and other civil remedies which
would be unavailable under international law. Importantly, it has recently
been confirmed that there is no requirement that the foreign victim exhaust
remedies available in their home state before approaching the US courts (Sarei
v. Rio Tinto PLC, US 9th Circuit CA, 12 April 2007, p. 4172).
Initially, the courts converted into torts only those acts which were seen to
violate peremptory norms (jus cogens) such as the bans on torture, genocide,
war crimes, and slavery (Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, US, 1984). Later the
courts allowed that, although it was important to be cautious, other
international standards might also be converted under the Act, so long as
they were ‘of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with specificity’ (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2004, pp. 30-1, per Justice
Souter. See Mank, 2007). Environmental harms were not considered to be
covered by the Act, until the 2006 decision of the Ninth Circuit of the US
Court Appeal in Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc. In that decision, the court allowed
present and former residents of Papua New Guinea to bring an action against
Rio Tinto, a British headquartered multinational mining corporation alleging
that the latter had dumped mining waste which eventually contaminated
international waters, contrary to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS)—a treaty which the United States has not ratified.
However the status of international environmental law under the ATCA
remains somewhat precarious.9
No final judgement has been delivered by the US courts against a corporation
in respect of a claim under the ATCA. However, some ATCA cases against
corporations have been settled, and some are pending at the time of writing.
For example, three ATCA actions have been initiated in New York between
                                                                                                                                             
Muchlinski, 2000.
7 Also referred to by the Supreme Court as the Alien Tort Claims Statute
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8 The law may originally have been intended to indicate that piracy
would not be tolerated (Human Rights Watch (US), ACTA Campaign
website).
9 The case was returned to a lower court for consideration. For an
update on progress, check for new versions of Mank’s (2007) paper available
on SSRN.
1996 and 2004 alleging that various individuals and companies connected to
Royal Dutch/Shell were complicit in acts of torture, detention and execution
in Nigeria of various civil society actors, most famously, Ken Saro-Wiwa in
1995 (Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Wiwa v. Anderson, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum
Development Company). The courts have accepted that they have personal and
subject matter jurisdiction in the cases, but ten years since their initiation, the
cases remain mired in the discovery process.
1.2.3 Limited liability and corporate groups
The principle of limited liability allows corporations, including those which
form part of a multinational enterprise, to mitigate their exposure to any
liability which they may attract. Regulators and victims of environmental
harm are just two types of ‘involuntary creditor’ to whom a company might
be indebted. The veil of incorporation shields shareholders from personal
liability to creditors. If there is no money in the company to pay a fine or
damages, then there will be no payment, regardless of the wealth of the
shareholders.
Importantly, there was no effort to reassess the principle of limited liability in
light of the fact that shareholders might now be corporations, rather than
humans. Philip Blumberg has observed that in the US, corporate groups were
awarded limited liability by ‘historical accident’, by the unthinking
application of the kind of formalistic logic that was typical of judicial
decisions at the time. ‘Limited liability protected shareholders’, and ‘a parent
corporation was a shareholder of the subsidiary. Ergo, limited liability
protected parent corporations.’ This line of reasoning not only ‘ignored
economic realities’, it also ‘made a mockery of the underlying objective of the
doctrine.’ An enterprise could ‘fragment’ its business into a number of
corporations, and the principle of limited liability would protect each
fragment from the liabilities of the other. Limited liability of corporate groups
has become ever-more problematic, and the challenge of responding to it  has
become ever-more complex, as enterprises have  adopted a multinational
form, and their liability has become divided across many tiers of companies
operating in different jurisdictions. ‘Modern law has faced the challenge of
responding to the consequences of this unwitting choice ever since’
(Blumberg, 1993, p. 59).
One reason why it might be important to trace liability back to a parent
company or other constituent entity of an MNE is that they may be the only
entity with enough assets available to compensate victims or pay fines. This
objective takes on a particular moral urgency in cases where an MNE has
been deliberately structured in order to limit its ability to pay up. Sometimes
shareholders ‘shift assets out of risky operating companies precisely in order
to minimize their potential…liability’. So, ‘to the extent that the corporate
form insulates shareholders from tort damages or fines, shareholders are free
to opt out of the laws that control the negative externalities of production,
including … environmental law, and tort law generally’. There have been
some efforts to restrict the ability of MNEs and national corporate groups to
mitigate their liability in this way, but they have tended to be limited and
unsuccessful (Hertig and Kanda, 2004, p. 76).
Most efforts to address the more perverse effects of limited liability for MNEs
(and domestic corporate groups) focus on connecting liability for a given harm
to the entities within the enterprise which had some form of control over the
perpetrator of the harm. An MNE is essentially ‘a single enterprise composed
of a number of affiliated business establishments, each functioning
simultaneously in different countries, and typically characterised by
centralized control and decentralized decision-making…’ (Wallace, 2002, p.
156). The legal form of an MNE is determined by the combined forces of its
own ‘internal rules’, such as the articles of association of its constituent
companies, and the ‘external rules’ of the national legal system within which
those constituent companies or other entities are based. The managerial
organization of an MNE will be ‘influenced by’, but ‘not always coincident
with’ legal form (Wallace, 2002, p. 159-61). For example, within an MNE, a
(legally separate) parent company may have substantial managerial control
over its subsidiary. That control may flow through various ties such as share
ownership, representation on the Board, or the ability to affect the financial
status of the subsidiary.
MNEs for their part naturally prefer to loiter demurely behind their many
corporate veils, and work tirelessly against efforts to apply enterprise liability.
For example, the US-based Union Carbide Corporation formed a
multinational enterprise with the ill-fated Bhopal plant at the time of the
disaster. It explains its relationship with the plant in the following careful
terms:
The Bhopal plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide
India, Limited (UCIL), an Indian company in which Union Carbide
Corporation held just over half the stock. The other stockholders
included Indian financial institutions and thousands of private
investors in India. The plant was designed, built and managed by
UCIL, using Indian consultants and workers. In 1994, Union
Carbide sold its entire stake in UCIL to MacLeod Russell (India)
Limited of Calcutta, and UCIL was renamed Eveready Industries
India, Limited (Eveready Industries). As a result of the sale of its
shares in UCIL, Union Carbide retained no interest in — or liability
for — the Bhopal site …(Union Carbide Bhopal Website, as at April
2007).
‘Union Carbide [UC] merged [in 2001] with a subsidiary of [Dow
Chemicals] and became a wholly-owned subsidiary of [Dow]. Dow
purchased all shares of UC stock but UC continues to exist as a
separate legal entity with its own assets and liabilities.
Stockholders are not responsible for liabilities, if any, of companies
in which they have invested’ (Union Carbide Bhopal Website up to
2004).
The task for regulators and victims of environmental harm is to uncover
relationships of control in the business practices of MNEs, and then to
construct a legally acceptable reason for using this de facto control to establish
de jure liability. But this difficulty is far from insurmountable in the presence
of political will. In the US, there have been  a number of movements towards
an ‘enterprise liability approach’ to corporate groups, including MNEs. These
have tended to be achieved under the auspices of a somewhat clumsy
‘piercing the veil jurisprudence’, as well as some loose references to the
principles of agency. For example, groups of companies are increasingly
asked to file ‘unitary’ tax returns, placing each entity’s activities in the
broader context of the group (Blumberg, 1993, Chapter 5). In the
environmental field, US law10 imposes on strict and far reaching liability on
parent companies and other institutional shareholders for the
environmentally harmful acts of their subsidiaries under the so called
‘Superfund Act’—the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 1980.11 However, it seems that in
practice the Act had done little to erode the principle of separate legal
personality. ‘While both the scope and nature of corporate environmental
liability has undoubtedly expanded under CERCLA, US court decisions have
generally proved consistent with traditional corporate law doctrine’. Despite
much ‘expansive’ judicial rhetoric, where liability has been extended to a
corporation’s officers, shareholders or parent, the direct ‘involvement’ of that
actor in a ‘wrongful act’ has been ‘key to the imposition of liability’ (Ong,
2001, p. 703). And in many other jurisdictions, and particularly in cases with a
trans-national  element, regulators and victims of environmental harm are
limited to pursuing impoverished decentralized entities, unable to trace
liability back to the legally separate, but practically connected and morally
responsible, controlling entity at the centre of the MNE.
2 The international regulatory scene
Despite the popular attention devoted to the relationship between MNEs and
the environment, and the clear appetite for international standards evidenced
in the Rio Tinto case and elsewhere, relatively little international law is
directed towards ensuring that corporations are directly liable for
environmental harm.12 Far more common are voluntary initiatives.
2.1 The Global Compact
In recent years, much emphasis has been placed upon the role of ‘corporate
social responsibility’ (CSR) as a tool for regulating the impact of corporations
on the environment. A key international milestone in this field occurred in
1999, when Kofi Annan called upon business leaders at the World Economic
Forum to join the UN and civil society organisations in a voluntary initiative
to support progress on environmental and social issues. By the spring of 2007,
the resulting ‘Global Compact’ claimed ‘over 3,800 participants, including
over 2,900 businesses in 100 countries around the world’ (Global Compact
Website). These businesses join with participants from UN Agencies, civil
society actors and labour organisations to form what can be described as a
network of support for certain principles. Of the ten Principles which form
the basis of the Compact, three relate to the environment.13 These are that
                                                 
10 For a review of corporate liability  for environmental harm in a
variety of other domestic jurisdictions see Ong, 2001, pp. 703-6.
11 For an insight into the operation of the Act, see the US
Environmental Protection Agency Superfund Website.
12 But note that if a treaty applies to all ‘persons’, it is necessary to
check whether the term includes not only ‘natural’ but also ‘legal’ persons,
which would include corporations. See for example the Bamako Convention
on the ban of the import into Africa and the control of transboundary waste
within Africa, 29 January 1991 (Clapham, 2006, p. 267).
13 The remaining seven principles relate to human rights, labour,
businesses: ‘should support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges’ (Principle Seven); ‘undertake initiatives to promote greater
environmental responsibility’ (Principle Eight); and ‘encourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies
(Principle Nine).
Some regard the Compact itself as a particularly vacuous contribution to an
already vacuous concept. For some, the very notion of CSR—of searching for
a corporate soul—is absurd or even repulsive (Corporate Watch, 2004).
Organisations such as Christian Aid, who have in the past supported CSR
initiatives, are now ‘calling on governments to resume their duties’ (Clapham,
2006, p. 195).   Joel Bakan dismisses CSR as ‘an oxymoron’. Even if
corporations were not hardwired to be psychopathic, it would still be strange
to think that they were best placed to regulate their own behaviour. ‘No one
would seriously suggest that individuals should regulate themselves, that
laws against murder, assault and theft are unnecessary because people are
socially responsible’(2004, p. 110). And corporations are even better
programmed that humans to privilege their own self-interests. The legal duty
to maximise shareholder value forces corporations to be ‘an externalizing
machine’, dumping the environmental costs of its activities on other actors
(Bakan, 2004, pp. 60-1). For this reason, ‘corporate social responsibility is in
fact illegal—at least when it is genuine’ (Bakan, 2004, pp. 37 and 109. See also
the CORE Website).
The Global Compact itself makes no mention of the polluter pays principle or
other reference to liability for environmental harm. This can hardly be a
surprise, since the initiative is entirely voluntary and considerations such as
the precautionary principle tend to conflict with the  ‘entrepreneurial, risk-
taking culture’ of business (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 10). However,
those who sign up to the Compact are required to submit reports as to their
social and environmental impact, and this opens up interesting possibilities.
In the last decade, activists have had some success in attaching liability to
corporations via their more disingenuous uses of the corporate social
responsibility bandwagon. For example, in the late 1990s, Nike engaged in a
publicity campaign to counterbalance allegations that the its suppliers were in
breach of labour standards internal to Nike, and of the laws of the South East
Asian countries in which they were based. Marc Kasky brought an action in
the courts of California alleging that in the course of the campaign Nike had
made six misrepresentations as to its activities, namely:
(1) "that workers who make NIKE products are . . . not subjected to
corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse;" (2) "that NIKE
products are made in accordance with applicable governmental
laws and regulations governing wages and hours;" (3) "that NIKE
products are made in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations governing health and safety conditions;" (4) "that NIKE
pays average line-workers double-the-minimum wage in Southeast
Asia;" (5) "that workers who produce NIKE products receive free
meals and health care;" and (6) "that NIKE guarantees a ' living
wage' for all workers who make NIKE products." In addition, the
                                                                                                                                             
and anti-corruption.
complaint alleges that NIKE made the false claim that the Young
report proves that it "is doing a good job and 'operating morally.' "
Kasky argued that, by allegedly misrepresenting its actions in this way, Nike
was  in  breach of various consumer and trading standards regulating
Californian businesses and professions (Marc Kasky v. Nike Inc. et al., 2000,
California Court of Appeal). The California Supreme Court found in favour of
Kasky, but the matter was settled after an appeal by Nike to the Supreme
Court.14 It is easy to imagine how a future claim might seek to make a
corporation liable for lying about environmental harm for which it is
responsible. In the UK, the Advertising Standards Agency has been used in
similar ways, although with no financial impact. For example, the Agency
agreed with Friends of the Earth that there was insufficient evidence to
support a claim, made in an advert released by Shell  shortly after the
execution of the activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, that most oil spills from Shell
facilities were caused by local saboteurs (Friends of the Earth Press Release,
10 July, 1996). Regulators have not called for Shell to tidy up the mess, just
that they not lie about its origins. It is remarkable that lying to consumers
carries more penalties than the environmental harm itself—such is the
importance of information in contemporary society and economy.
2.2 The OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are altogether more
explicit than the Global Compact about the fact that corporate hearts need a
financial jump-start. They emphasise that ‘[s]ound environmental
management is…both a business responsibility and a business opportunity’.
They observe that good environmental practice can secure a mixture of
economic (lower operating and insurance costs, greater access to capital and
customer satisfaction), legal (reduced compliance and liability charges),
environmental (improved energy and resource conservation) and social
(improved community and public relations) benefits (OECD, 2000,
Commentary para. 31. Original Emphasis). But, in the end, it remains
necessary to ensure that those responsible for running corporations are
convinced that being environmentally friendly ‘costs less’ than causing
environmental harm—either because being environmentally friendly is cheap,
or because causing environmental harm is expensive. Environmental harm
can only be expensive if it has consequences such as lost sales and/or
investment, or because they will be made comprehensively liable for it. This
requires that consumers and investors be far thicker on the ground, or that
environmental liability be more keenly targeted on the relevant parts of
MNEs, than they are at present.
The OECD Guidelines themselves are voluntary standards, negotiated and
agreed by national governments in 1976, which have included a reference to
environmental considerations since 1991. The Commentary accompanying the
OECD Guidelines emphasises that they consciously ‘draw upon, but do not
completely mirror, any existing instrument’ (Commentary para 38):
                                                 
14 Under the settlement, Nike agreed to pay a $1.5 million—about
half of one day’s advertising budget—to an industry-dominated labour
standards organisation (Reclaim Democracy Website as at March, 2007).
The text of the Environment Chapter broadly reflects the principles
and objectives contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, in Agenda 21 (within the Rio Declaration). It
also takes into account the (Aarhus) Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making, and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters and reflects standards contained
in such instruments as the ISO Standard on Environmental
Management Systems (OECD, 2000, Commentary para. 30.
Original emphasis).
Chapter Five of the Guidelines relates specifically to the environment and
states that
Enterprises should, within the framework of laws, regulations and
administrative practices in the countries in which they operate, and
in consideration of relevant international agreements, principles,
objectives, and standards, take due account of the need to protect
the environment, public health and safety, and generally to
conduct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal
of sustainable development (Chapter 5).15
It goes on to list a number of ways in which MNEs ‘should’ limit the risk that
environmental harm will occur as a result of their activities, and mitigate the
effects of any environmental harm which does occur. It states that MNEs
should ‘[m]aintain contingency plans for preventing, mitigating, and
controlling serious environmental…damage from their operations…; and
mechanisms for immediate reporting to the competent authorities’ (Chapter 5,
para. 5). Furthermore, MNEs should be governed by the precautionary
principle, and should  ‘not use the lack of full scientific certainty as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent or minimise such damage’
(Chapter 5, para. 6). The ‘basic premise of the Guidelines is that enterprises
should act as soon as possible, and in a proactive way, to avoid, for instance,
serious or irreversible environmental damages resulting from their activities’
(Commentary para 38). In this context, the task of the Guidelines is not to
‘reinterpret any existing instruments or to create new commitments or
precedents on the part of governments’, but ‘to recommend how the
precautionary approach should be implemented at the level of enterprises…’
(Commentary para 39).
But the most glaring hole in the Guidelines for the purposes of the present
chapter is that, beyond the comment that fines can be avoided by good
environmental practice (Para. 31), there is no mention of liability for
environmental harm. However, to the extent that a corporation claims to
uphold the Guidelines, but in fact fails to do so, there may be space for a
Krasky-Nike style challenge.
                                                 
15 Other provisions also emphasise the need for MNEs to
‘contribute’ to ‘environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable
development’ (OECD Guidelines, 2000, General Policies, para. 1). Similarly,
the 1999 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance states that the board of a
company has a responsibility to ‘implement systems designed to ensure that
the corporation obeys applicable laws, including …environmental…’ (Section
V).
What the Guidelines offer in lieu of liability is naming, which may eventually
lead to shaming, in the form of lost sales or investment, ethical investors and
shoppers willing. Thus, naming may lead a company voluntarily to decide to
remedy the damage that they have caused. While this is not equivalent to
accepting liability—indeed, such agreements are often accompanied by a
statement of non-liability—it can be regarded as a measure having an effect in
some respects equivalent to liability.
One conduit for naming is the system of National Contact Points (NCP)
introduced in 2000. Countries adhering to the Guidelines are charged with
establishing NCPs to aid in the implementation of the Guidelines. An
important function of the NCPs is to
‘contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating to
implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances. The NCP will
offer a forum for discussion and assist the business community,
employee organisations and other parties concerned to deal with
the issues raised in an efficient and timely manner and in
accordance with applicable law’ (OECD, 2000, Procedural
Guidance, Part C. Emphasis added.).
Table 1 sets out all ‘specific instances’ reported by the OECD which were
described as involving environmental issues. The first point to note is they are
few in number. In some cases, NCPs have been successful in resolving
‘specific instances’ of environmental harm by MNEs. For example, in 2002,
Marine Harvest, a Chilean subsidiary of the multinational enterprise
NUTRECO, was accused by the NGOs Friends of the Earth (The Netherlands)
and Ecoceanos (Chile) of ‘not observing certain environmental and labour
recommendations’. The Chilean NCP mediated the discussion between these
and other actors, and issued a report. Most of the Report’s recommendations
were accepted by the parties and the OECD notes that the ‘case had an
important impact on the country and above all on the regions where the units
of the enterprise are established’ (OECD, 20006, p. 5).
However, the varying success of NCPs can be illustrated by reference to two
Canadian examples. In 2001, the Canadian NCP was notified of the
‘impending removal of local farmers from the land of a Zambian copper
mining company’, co-owned by a Canadian company and a Swiss company.
The removal was expected to infringe upon, among other things, the
environmental Chapter V of the Guidelines. The OECD reports that ‘[w]ith
the Canadian NCP acting as a communications facilitator, a resolution was
reached after the company met with groups from the affected communities’16
(OECD, 2006, p. 5). On the other hand, a complaint in 2002 by a Canadian
labour organisation regarding the fact that Canadian companies were
engaged in business in Myanmar, a country which does not adhere to the
Guidelines, was less successful. The NCP was unable ‘to bring the parties
together for a dialogue’ (OECD, 2006, p. 5). NGOs have tended to criticise
NCPs as being inaccessible to those who wish to register complaints, and
unduly opaque in their dealings (Clapham, 2006, pp. 208-9). These complaints
                                                 
16 The final communication sent by the Canadian NCP to the Canadian
company is available at http://www.ncppcn.gc.ca/annual_2002-en.asp.
are especially significant given the extent to which the Guidelines rely on
naming as a regulatory mechanism.
Table 1: Environmental issues considered by National Contact Points to June 200617
Year NCP Subject Host country
2001 Canada, Switzerland Copper mining Zambia





Animal and fish feed Chile
2003 Sweden Gold sector
(Sandvik, Atlas Copco)
Ghana
2003 France N/A France
2003 France Oil pipeline Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Georgia
2004 Belgium Copper mining (ForrestGroup) Dem. Rep. of Congo
2004 Belgium Hydro-electric dam
(Tractebel-Suez)
Laos
2004 Belgium Financiers of pipeline
(KBC, DEXI A, ING)
Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Turkey
2004 Brazil Dam construction Brazil
2004 France Hydro-electric project Laos
2004 Italy N/A Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Georgia




2005 Canada Doing business in non-adhering
country
Ecuador
2005 Chile N/A Chile
2006 Brazil N/A Brazil
2.3 The UN Norms
The most recent development in the sphere of non-binding instruments
relating to corporations and the environment is the UN Norms on the
                                                 
17 This list does not include those instances or details which
the OECD Secretariat chooses to withhold on the grounds that their release
would prejudice the implementation of the Guidelines (OECD, 2006, Title
page).
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. These were approved in 2003 by
the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
a body of independent human rights experts.
Section G relates specifically to ‘obligations with regard to environmental
protection’. It is broadly similar to the equivalent provisions in the
Guidelines, and reads as follows:
14. Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall
carry out their activities in accordance with national laws,
regulations, administrative practices and policies relating to the
preservation of the environment of the countries in which they
operate, as well as in accordance with relevant international
agreements, principles, objectives, responsibilities and standards
with regard to the environment as well as human rights, public
health and safety, bioethics and the precautionary principle, and
shall generally conduct their activities in a manner contributing to
the wider goal of sustainable development (UN Norms, 2003, para
14).
The issue in respect of which the Norms represents an advance in the field is
liability. The ‘polluter pays’ principle is not specifically mentioned in the text
of the Norms. However it is implied by the following term:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall
provide prompt, effective and adequate reparation to those persons,
entities and communities that have been adversely affected by
failures to comply with these Norms through, inter alia,
reparations, restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for any
damage done or property taken. In connection with determining
damages, in regard to criminal sanctions, and in all other respects,
these Norms shall be applied by national courts and/or
international tribunals, pursuant to national and international law
(Para. 18. Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Commentary relating specifically to the environmental
provisions notes that businesses ‘shall be responsible for the environmental
and human health impact of all of their activities, including any products or
services they introduce into commerce’ (UN Norms, 2003, para. b of
Commentary to G(14)).
Although non-binding, the Norms are expected eventually to have some legal
effect for a variety of reasons. First, the Norms resulted from the kind of
formal UN process of consultation which has produced soft law in other
fields, are likely to be referred to by international legal bodies, and draw on
existing international standards. Furthermore, they are ‘self-consciously
normative’ in tone, framed in terms of what ‘shall’ than what ‘should’ happen
(Amnesty International, 2004, pp. 6-7). In this vein, the Norms pay attention
to the practical matter of implementation and enforcement, drawing on
existing national and corporate mechanisms. For example, States are urged to
‘establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative framework for
ensuring that the Norms and other relevant national and international laws
are implemented by transnational corporations and other business
enterprises’ (Para. 17). Companies are told to incorporate the Norms into their
internal policy and into their contracts with other parties, and train their staff
to ensure that they are aware of the Norms (Para. 15). Where this occurs, there
might be scope for activists to launch a Krasky-style attack on corporations
which do not then uphold the Norms. Nonetheless, the Norms in no way
secure corporate liability for environmental harm.
2.4 Getting serious
A range of conventions seek to secure corporate liability for environmental
harm in a small number of potentially harmful sectors. For example,
companies operating in the nuclear industry are also subject to strict, albeit
limited, liability under various specialist conventions (See Ong, 2001, pp. 698-
9). Such regimes often include a collective fund for compensation financed by
compulsory insurance. An example is the  Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (Civil Liability Convention), 1992, and its
accompanying International Convention Civil Liability Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention), 1992.18 Under
this regime, liability for damage caused from oil leaking or discharged from a
ship after a collision is borne by the owner of the ship. Governments and
regulatory authorities can be compensated for losses incurred ‘for clean up
operations of preventive measures’; while private actors, such as fishermen
and hotel owners, can claim for damages resulting from the pollution, for
example to their nets or to their trade. With very few exceptions, the ship
owner’s liability is strict. In the case of fault by the owner, that liability is also
unlimited. The Fund Convention ensures that where compensation is not
available from the owner, it can be obtained from a general fund (Secretariat
for the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, 2007, p. 7).19
The broadest and most robust effort to date to address corporate liability for
environmental harm is the Council of Europe’s Lugano Convention on Civil
Liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment
(1993). This seeks, among other things, to ensure ‘adequate compensation for
damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment…’(Article 1).
Actions may be brought against the operator responsible in the national
courts of the place where the damage was suffered, or where the defendant
habitually resides, or ‘where the dangerous activity was conducted’ (Article
19(1)). The ability of corporations to strategically mitigate their exposure to
damages is tackled by the requirement that States Parties for them obtain
insurance (See, for example, Lugano Convention, Article 12). However, it is
                                                 
18 These began life as the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, entered into force in 1975, denounced by many nations
and amended by protocol to form the 1992 Convention, in force in 1996; and
the 1971 International Convention Civil Liability Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, which, due to denunciations, ceased to be in effect in
2002, and was replaced by the 1992 Convention, in force 1996 (Secretariat for
the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, 2007, p. 1).
19 Closely modelled on that 1969 Convention, the  International
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001, seeks to
ensure that those who suffer damage as a consequence of oil leaking from
ships’ bunkers receive adequate compensation. The latter has yet to achieve
the support necessary to enter into force.
perhaps testimony to the degree to which the treaty’s title lives up to its
content that it is currently languishing with just nine signatures.
On a more positive note, the Lugano Convention served as inspiration for
Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage. The damage covered includes direct or
indirect damage to the aquatic environment, protected species and natural
habitats , and contamination of the land which creates a significant risk to
human health. Strict liability is imposed on operators for damage caused by
inherently dangerous activities, and fault-based liability for damage caused
by other activities. National regulatory authorities are to take the necessary
action to impose liability, but members of the public can ask for action to be
taken, and can challenge the action and inaction of regulators by judicial
review (See Wijnants, 2005).
3 Conclusion
There are significant theoretical and practical difficulties associated with
imposing liability for environmental harm upon  corporations, in particular
those involved in MNEs. Their complex, transnational structures ensure that
MNEs can be difficult to track, let alone pin, down. They can locate their
facilities where environmental regulation is weak or not enforced; or, when
faced with the threat of litigation, ‘shop’ for a forum in which their liability to
victims is likely to be relatively low, or where court procedures are more
likely to stall. When cornered, MNEs are often able to use the principle of
limited liability to keep their resources out of the reach of creditors. But many
of these difficulties are legal constructs. The corporate form is a legal
construct and as such can be moulded, or even dismantled, by legal reform.
Whether these difficulties are surmounted is to a large degree dependant
upon the prevailing political wind.
The legal framework regarding corporate liability for environmental harm is
much like a dusty patchwork quilt: quaint, custodian of much corporate
history, but moth-eaten and prone to fraying under duress. In the absence of a
robust international legal system, those who seek to hold MNEs to account for
environmental harm have sought to use national law, such as the ATCA and
trading standards, to give effect to international law and norms. But closing
the gargantuan gaps through which MNEs are able to evade liability for
environmental harm requires some more holistic national and international
action.
States might try to take forward the Lugano framework, implementing and
extending it. The homes states of MNEs might challenge global objections to
giving national legislation extraterritorial effect, and encourage greater
enthusiasm among judiciary for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over
entities registered in host states, and for pursuing their parent companies at
home. Such options are complicated and would have legal, economic and
diplomatic implications. But these surely weigh lightly against the ghastly,
iconic wreckage of Bhopal, the Niger Delta and other sites of environmental
harm.
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